

May 2017

## The Effectiveness of Reentry Programs for Incarcerated Persons: *Findings for the Washington Statewide Reentry Council*

The 2016 Washington State Legislature created the Statewide Reentry Council (Council) with the goals of improving recidivism and other outcomes for people who return to the community after incarceration.<sup>1</sup> This legislation also directed the Washington State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP) to review the effectiveness of various programs for this population. Specifically, the legislation directed WSIPP to:

- “conduct a meta-analysis<sup>2</sup> on ... programs aimed at assisting offenders with reentering the community after incarceration” and
- “report on the types of programs ... effective in reducing recidivism among the general offender population.”

WSIPP also produced updated benefit-cost findings as a part of this analysis.<sup>3</sup> This report contains our findings, due to the Council, the governor, and the legislature by June 1, 2017.

### Summary

The 2016 Washington State Legislature created the Statewide Reentry Council with the goals of reducing recidivism and improving other outcomes for people who return to the community after incarceration. This legislation also directed WSIPP to examine the effectiveness of reentry programs through a systematic review of the research literature.

When WSIPP undertakes this type of research, we use a standardized set of procedures to estimate a program’s average effectiveness at achieving a desired outcome (e.g., reducing recidivism). Whenever possible, we also calculate monetary benefits and costs and conduct a risk analysis to determine which programs consistently have benefits that exceed costs.

Of the 59 programs we reviewed for this report, 43 reported effects on recidivism. More than half of those programs (53%) demonstrated statistically significant reductions in recidivism.

For the 45 programs that we could analyze through our benefit-cost process, we found that 64% had benefits that are likely to outweigh their costs at least 75% of the time.

<sup>1</sup>Second Substitute House Bill 2791, Chapter 188, Laws of 2016. The 15 members of the Council were appointed by the governor and represent a variety of institutions including correctional agencies, prosecutors and public defenders, law enforcement, housing and service providers, and representatives of victims of crime and formerly incarcerated individuals.

<sup>2</sup>For a definition of “meta-analysis,” see page 3 of this report.

<sup>3</sup>WSIPP’s Board of Directors authorized a collaborative project with the Pew-MacArthur Results First Initiative, which allowed us to update our benefit-cost model and conduct the benefit-cost analysis for this report.

### Suggested citation:

Bitney, K., Drake, E., Grice, J., Hirsch, M. & Lee, S. (2017). *The effectiveness of reentry programs for incarcerated persons: findings for the Washington Statewide Reentry Council* (Document Number 17-05-1901). Olympia: Washington State Institute for Public Policy.

## I. Research Methods

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The Washington State Legislature often directs WSIPP to study the effectiveness and assess the potential benefits and costs of programs and policies that could be implemented in Washington State.

These studies are designed to provide policymakers with objective information about which programs or policy options (“programs”) work to achieve desired outcomes (e.g. reduced crime or improved health) and what the long-term economic consequences of these options are likely to be.

WSIPP implements a rigorous three-step research approach to undertake this type of study. Through these three steps we:

- 1) **Identify what works (and what does not).** We systematically review all rigorous research evidence and estimate the program’s effect on a desired outcome or set of outcomes. The evidence may indicate that a program worked (i.e. had a desirable effect on outcomes), caused harm (i.e. had an undesirable effect on outcomes), or had no detectable effect one way or the other.
- 2) **Assess the return on investment.** Given the estimated effect of a program from Step 1, we estimate—in dollars and cents—how much it would benefit people in Washington to implement the program, and how much it would cost the taxpayers to achieve this result. We use WSIPP’s benefit-cost model to develop standardized, comparable results that

illustrate the expected return on investment. We present these results with a net present value for each program, on a per-participant basis. We also consider to whom these benefits accrue: program participants, taxpayers, and other people in society.

- 3) **Determine the risk of investment.**

We assess the riskiness of our conclusions by calculating the probability that a program will at least “break even” if critical factors—like the actual cost to implement the program and the precise effect of the program—are lower or higher than our estimates.

We follow a set of standardized procedures (see [Exhibit 1](#)) for each of these steps. These standardized procedures support the rigor of our analysis and allow programs to be compared on an apples-to-apples basis.

For full detail on WSIPP’s methods, see WSIPP’s [Technical Documentation](#).<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Washington State Institute for Public Policy (May 2017). Benefit-cost technical documentation. Olympia, WA: Author.

## Exhibit 1

### WSIPP's Three-Step Approach

#### Step 1: Identify what works (and what does not)

We conduct a meta-analysis—a quantitative review of the research literature—to determine if the weight of the research evidence indicates whether desired outcomes are achieved, on average.

WSIPP follows several key protocols to ensure a rigorous analysis for each program examined. We:

- **Search for all studies on a topic**—We systematically review the national and international research literature and consider all available studies on a program, regardless of their findings. That is, we do not “cherry pick” studies to include in our analysis.
- **Screen studies for quality**—We only include rigorous studies in our analysis. We require that a study reasonably attempt to demonstrate causality using appropriate statistical techniques. For example, studies must include both treatment and comparison groups with an intent-to-treat analysis. Studies that do not meet our minimum standards are excluded from analysis.
- **Determine the average effect size**—We use a formal set of statistical procedures to calculate an average effect size for each outcome, which indicates the expected magnitude of change caused by the program (e.g., correctional education) for each outcome of interest (e.g., crime).

#### Step 2: Assess the return on investment

WSIPP has developed, and continues to refine, an economic model to provide internally consistent monetary valuations of the benefits and costs of each program on a per-participant basis.

Benefits to individuals and society may stem from multiple sources. For example, a program that reduces the need for government services decreases taxpayer costs. If that program also improves participants' educational outcomes, it will increase their expected labor market earnings. Finally, if a program reduces crime, it will also reduce expected costs to crime victims.

We also estimate the cost required to implement an intervention. If the program is operating in Washington State, our preferred method is to obtain the service delivery and administrative costs from state or local agencies. When this approach is not possible, we estimate costs using the research literature, using estimates provided by program developers, or using a variety of sources to construct our own cost estimate.

#### Step 3: Determine the risk of investment

Any tabulation of benefits and costs involves a degree of uncertainty about the inputs used in the analysis, as well as the bottom-line estimates. An assessment of risk is expected in any investment analysis, whether in the private or public sector.

To assess the riskiness of our conclusions, we look at thousands of different scenarios through a Monte Carlo simulation. In each scenario we vary a number of key factors in our calculations (e.g., expected effect sizes, program costs), using estimates of error around each factor. The purpose of this analysis is to determine the probability that a particular program or policy will produce benefits that are equal to or greater than costs if the real-world conditions are different than our baseline assumptions.

## Programs reviewed

For this assignment, we considered a wide variety of programs that aim to assist individuals with reentry into the community.<sup>5</sup> To better inform the scope of work, we paid particular attention to programs classified as “evidence-based” and currently in use by the Washington Department of Corrections.<sup>6</sup> We also attended Council meetings and, when possible, examined programs of particular interest to the Council.<sup>7</sup>

Prior to undertaking this assignment, WSIPP reviewed the effectiveness of and completed benefit-cost analyses for a variety of programs for persons in the criminal justice system.<sup>8</sup> A significant portion of these programs had not been updated recently, and additional rigorous evidence has since been published.

For this report, we reviewed the effectiveness of 59 programs. Specifically, we:

- Updated 31 of WSIPP’s prior meta-analyses and
- Examined the research literature for 28 new programs not analyzed previously.

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<sup>5</sup> We use the term “program” throughout this report to refer to any programs, policies, or interventions.

<sup>6</sup> See, for example: Drake, E. (2013). *Inventory of evidence-based and research-based programs for adult corrections* (Doc. No. 13-12-1901). Olympia: Washington State Institute for Public Policy.

<sup>7</sup> Preliminary findings were shared with the Council in October 2016 for feedback and suggestions.

<sup>8</sup> See, for example: Aos, S., & Drake, E. (2013). *Prison, police, and programs: Evidence-based options that reduce crime and save money* (Doc. No. 13-11-1901). Olympia: Washington State Institute for Public Policy.

For this report, we focused on reentry programs for adults in the criminal justice system. Results on reentry programs for youth in the juvenile justice system will be available in September 2017. See footnote 3 on the first page of this report.

## Outcomes examined

In general, we required that a study measure recidivism—a common indicator of successful reentry—in order to be included in this report.<sup>9</sup> Recidivism is measured broadly; we included studies that measure subsequent arrests, charges, convictions, or incarcerations, as well as self-reported involvement in crime.

Our benefit-cost findings are primarily driven by changes in recidivism. When crime occurs, both taxpayers and crime victims incur costs. Taxpayers bear the costs of the criminal justice system (e.g., police, courts, and corrections). Crime victims bear the tangible (e.g., property loss or medical expenses) and intangible (e.g., pain and suffering) costs. These costs are avoided when crime does not occur, benefiting both taxpayers and would-be victims.

WSIPP updated and refined its benefit-cost model to provide more-current monetary estimates for this study. We updated three main components of the model, using the most recently-available Washington State data:

### 1) Recidivism timing and frequency.

We examined the recidivism patterns of various criminal justice-involved populations to update our estimates of whether and when people will recidivate, on average.<sup>10</sup> These recidivism patterns serve as the basis

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<sup>9</sup> Exceptions include programs of interest to the Council where recidivism was not measured by the research literature. We examined these other outcomes and report these programs in the Technical Appendix, but we cannot conduct benefit-cost analysis for these outcomes.

<sup>10</sup> We do this analysis using WSIPP’s criminal history database, which was developed to conduct criminal justice research at the request of the legislature. The database is a synthesis of data from the Administrative Office of the Courts and the Department of Corrections.

for determining the timing and magnitude of expected costs or cost savings if a program is demonstrated to change recidivism outcomes.

2) [Criminal justice system use.](#)

We estimate the likelihood that criminal justice system resources (e.g. police, courts, corrections) will be used when a crime occurs and how long that resource will be used. For example, if an aggravated assault occurs, we estimate the chance that a person will receive a prison sentence and how long the sentence will be. We updated these estimates using the most recently available Washington State data.

3) [Criminal justice system costs.](#)

We updated cost estimates for each component of the criminal justice system (e.g., the cost of police, courts, and corrections) based on the most recently available data.

Additional detail on these methods can be found in WSIPP's [Technical Documentation](#).

In addition to recidivism, we systematically examined other outcomes that can be monetized in WSIPP's benefit-cost model. These include, for example, substance use (e.g., misuse of illicit drugs or alcohol), emergency department visits, and psychiatric symptoms. Not all studies report on these outcomes.

In some cases, we examined outcomes that cannot be monetized in WSIPP's benefit-cost model. These include, for example, homelessness, parental stress, drinking and driving, technical violations, and employment.<sup>11</sup> We meta-analyze these outcomes and report the findings for informational purposes; however, these observed effects do not contribute to the benefit-cost analysis.

For some programs, these non-monetized outcomes are reported in addition to recidivism. For other programs—including civil legal aid, removing criminal record check boxes in hiring, and legal financial obligations—they are the only outcomes reported. We cannot produce benefit cost findings when these are the only reported outcomes.

We provide additional detail on programs reviewed for this report that have not undergone our standard benefit-cost analysis in [Appendix II](#). All outcomes analyzed, monetized, and non-monetized, are reported in [Appendix I](#) and on our website.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Although we monetize the value of increased employment for some populations, we cannot presently monetize employment for criminal justice-involved populations. We believe it may be possible to monetize the outcomes of employment and technical violations for criminal justice-involved individuals in future iterations of the benefit-cost model. This would require analysis of the likelihood of employment and expected earnings for these populations, along with the likelihood of technical violations for those who do not recidivate.

<sup>12</sup> This report contains our bottom-line benefit-cost results. For detail on our meta-analytic results by program, see WSIPP's website. All recidivism outcomes are combined and reported as "crime" in the meta-analytic results on our website.

## II. Findings

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We present our meta-analytic findings on the effectiveness of each program in reducing recidivism, and then discuss our benefit-cost results. Descriptions of each program are available in the [Program Description Appendix](#).

### [Meta-analytic findings](#)

Of the 59 programs that we reviewed for effectiveness, 43 had sufficient rigorous research for us to compute an average effect size on recidivism. Of these 43 programs, 23 (53%) have a statistically significant reduction in recidivism. We display each of the 43 program's effects on recidivism in [Exhibit 2](#). We also include effect sizes for eight previously reviewed programs that were not updated for this report, for a total of 51 effect sizes.

In [Exhibit 2](#), the weighted average effect size for each program is represented by a blue dot. Positive effect sizes indicate an increase in recidivism, while negative effect sizes indicate a reduction in recidivism.

The error bars around each effect size represent the precision of our estimate; shorter error bars reflect greater precision, while longer error bars reflect less precision. If the error bars do not cross zero (i.e., the axis on the chart) the program has a statistically significant effect on recidivism.<sup>13</sup>


In addition, several studies examined outcomes other than recidivism, like employment or reductions in substance use. We present complete meta-analytic findings for all programs in [Appendix I](#) and on our website.

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<sup>13</sup> At a 95% level of confidence.


## Exhibit 2

### Reentry Programs: Weighted Mean Effect Size for Recidivism<sup>#</sup>



**Exhibit 2 (Continued)**

Reentry Programs: Weighted Mean Effect Size for Recidivism<sup>#</sup>





## Benefit-cost findings

Of the 51 programs presented in [Exhibit 2](#), we could conduct benefit-cost analysis for 45 programs. We present our bottom-line estimates of the per-participant benefits and costs in [Exhibit 4](#). This display includes 38 programs newly reviewed or updated for this report, as well as seven previously reviewed topics for which we updated the benefit-cost results only.

We find that 36 (80%) of the 45 programs demonstrate benefits that outweigh costs on average, while 9 (20%) do not. While this benefit-minus-cost estimate provides one summary of how long-term monetary benefits stack up against cost, there is always uncertainty in this estimate. Through our risk analysis, we find that 29 (64%) of the programs have at least a 75% chance of breaking even.

[Exhibit 3](#) describes how to interpret our results presented in [Exhibit 4](#).

### Exhibit 3

#### How to Interpret WSIPP's Benefit-Cost Results

The numbered columns on [Exhibit 4](#) are described, respectively, below.

- 1) [Program name](#) describes the name of the program or policy analyzed. Some programs are general categories of a type of program, while others are specific name-brand programs and on our website.<sup>#</sup>
- 2) [Total benefits](#) are the average benefits of the program, per-participant. This is the sum of the taxpayer and non-taxpayer benefits.
- 3) [Taxpayer benefits](#) are benefits that accrue to the taxpayers of the state of Washington through a variety of sources, including costs avoided in the criminal justice system and publicly funded health care costs avoided due to reductions in substance use.
- 4) [Non-taxpayer benefits](#) include benefits that accrue directly to program participants; benefits that accrue to others in society, such as the reduced costs to victims of crime from avoided crime; and indirect benefits, such as the value of living longer and the deadweight costs of taxation.
- 5) [Costs](#) are the estimated per-participant cost to implement the program in Washington, relative to the cost of treatment as usual. If the cost is positive, the intervention is estimated to be cheaper than the treatment as usual.
- 6) [Benefits minus costs](#) are the net benefits, or the difference between the total benefits and the cost to implement the program, per-participant. If this number is positive, the expected benefits of the program exceed the estimated cost. If this number is negative, the program is estimated to cost more than the sum of the expected benefits.
- 7) [Benefit-to-cost ratios](#) represent the estimated value to Washington State for each dollar invested in the program. It is the total benefits divided by the cost of the program. When the program cost is positive, the benefit-to-cost ratio is designated as "n/a"—not applicable.
- 8) [Chances benefits will exceed costs](#) describes the "risk" of the investment. In our benefit-cost analysis, we account for uncertainty in our estimates by allowing key inputs to vary across thousands of scenarios. We run our benefit-cost model 10,000 times; this statistic shows the percentage of cases in which total benefits were greater than the costs.

<sup>#</sup> The benefit-cost section of WSIPP's website presents our current findings for a variety of public policy topics. Items on these tables are updated periodically as new information becomes available. Interested readers can find more information by clicking each entry in the tables.

### Exhibit 4

#### Monetary Benefits and Costs of Evidence-Based Reentry Programs: Per Program Participant Estimates as of May 2017

Program name (1)	Total benefits (2)	Taxpayer benefits (3)	Non-taxpayer benefits (4)	Costs (5)	Benefits minus costs (net present value) (6)	Benefit to cost ratio (7)	Chance benefits will exceed costs (8)
Offender Reentry Community Safety Program (for individuals with serious mental illness)	\$69,950	\$23,873	\$46,077	(\$36,726)	\$33,224	\$1.90	96%
Circles of Support and Accountability	\$28,512	\$6,931	\$21,581	(\$3,906)	\$24,606	\$7.30	92%
Correctional education (post-secondary education)	\$24,711	\$6,732	\$17,979	(\$1,248)	\$23,462	\$19.79	100%
Employment counseling and job training (transitional reentry from incarceration into the community)	\$23,721	\$6,632	\$17,089	(\$2,434)	\$21,287	\$9.75	97%
Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative (for persons convicted of drug offenses)	\$22,656	\$6,738	\$15,918	(\$1,629)	\$21,027	\$13.91	99%
Vocational education in prison	\$17,781	\$4,923	\$12,858	(\$1,495)	\$16,286	\$11.89	97%
Case management ("swift, certain, and fair") for drug-involved persons	\$15,069	\$4,389	\$10,681	\$381	\$15,451	n/a	100%
Electronic monitoring (probation)	\$13,723	\$3,868	\$9,855	\$1,138	\$14,861	n/a	93%
Mental health courts	\$17,171	\$4,980	\$12,191	(\$3,106)	\$14,065	\$5.53	95%
Intensive supervision (surveillance and treatment)	\$13,210	\$3,907	\$9,303	(\$813)	\$12,397	\$16.25	100%
Reentry courts	\$16,912	\$5,153	\$11,760	(\$4,922)	\$11,990	\$3.44	95%
Inpatient or intensive outpatient drug treatment during incarceration	\$13,085	\$3,651	\$9,434	(\$1,289)	\$11,796	\$10.15	98%
Therapeutic communities (in the community) for individuals with co-occurring disorders	\$16,448	\$4,872	\$11,576	(\$5,092)	\$11,357	\$3.23	87%
Correctional education (basic skills)	\$12,076	\$3,379	\$8,697	(\$1,249)	\$10,827	\$9.67	98%
Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative (for persons convicted of property offenses)	\$12,349	\$3,774	\$8,575	(\$1,629)	\$10,721	\$7.58	71%
Outpatient or non-intensive drug treatment during incarceration	\$10,592	\$2,916	\$7,676	(\$748)	\$9,844	\$14.16	99%
Outpatient or non-intensive drug treatment in the community	\$10,340	\$3,071	\$7,269	(\$769)	\$9,572	\$13.45	100%
Electronic monitoring (parole)	\$8,259	\$2,041	\$6,219	\$1,139	\$9,398	n/a	100%
"Swift, certain, and fair" supervision	\$9,150	\$2,552	\$6,598	\$68	\$9,218	n/a	87%
Drug courts	\$13,926	\$4,888	\$9,038	(\$4,924)	\$9,002	\$2.83	100%
Therapeutic communities (during incarceration) for individuals with substance use disorders	\$11,092	\$2,966	\$8,126	(\$2,198)	\$8,894	\$5.05	96%
Risk Need and Responsivity supervision (for individuals classified as high- and moderate-risk)	\$9,592	\$2,947	\$6,645	(\$1,372)	\$8,220	\$6.99	98%
Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative (SVORI)	\$22,719	\$8,120	\$14,599	(\$14,535)	\$8,184	\$1.56	89%
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) (for individuals classified as high- or moderate-risk)	\$8,817	\$2,732	\$6,085	(\$1,395)	\$7,422	\$6.32	100%

**Note:**

For informational purposes, we provide updated benefit-cost findings for all adult correctional intervention programs analyzed by WSIPP regardless of whether we updated the systematic review of the research literature for this report. This table better illustrates a current snapshot of all adult corrections programs analyzed to date by WSIPP.

### Exhibit 4 (Continued)

#### Monetary Benefits and Costs of Evidence-Based Reentry Programs: Per Program Participant Estimates as of May 2017

Program name (1)	Total benefits (2)	Taxpayer benefits (3)	Non-taxpayer benefits (4)	Costs (5)	Benefits minus costs (net present value) (6)	Benefit to cost ratio (7)	Chance benefits will exceed costs (8)
Therapeutic communities (in the community) for individuals with substance use disorders	\$9,617	\$3,074	\$6,544	(\$3,784)	\$5,833	\$2.54	80%
Correctional industries in prison	\$6,151	\$1,700	\$4,451	(\$485)	\$5,666	\$12.68	100%
Case management (not "swift, certain, and fair") for drug-involved persons	\$5,714	\$1,527	\$4,187	(\$385)	\$5,329	\$14.84	85%
Work release	\$4,303	\$1,067	\$3,236	\$503	\$4,806	n/a	99%
Police diversion for low-severity offenses (pre-arrest)	\$3,911	\$1,114	\$2,797	\$555	\$4,466	n/a	87%
Day reporting centers	\$7,938	\$2,855	\$5,083	(\$3,989)	\$3,949	\$1.99	76%
Employment counseling and job training in the community	\$4,240	\$1,496	\$2,744	(\$1,963)	\$2,277	\$2.16	74%
Treatment in the community for individuals convicted of sex offenses	\$4,027	\$1,184	\$2,843	(\$2,418)	\$1,609	\$1.67	60%
Treatment during incarceration for individuals convicted of sex offenses	\$5,967	\$1,805	\$4,163	(\$4,574)	\$1,394	\$1.30	62%
Restorative justice conferencing	\$2,391	\$904	\$1,487	(\$1,110)	\$1,282	\$2.15	58%
Sober living houses	\$1,551	\$193	\$1,358	(\$287)	\$1,264	\$5.40	70%
Intensive supervision (surveillance only)	\$398	\$128	\$270	(\$107)	\$290	\$3.71	53%
Jail diversion for individuals with mental illness (post-arrest)	(\$623)	(\$378)	(\$245)	\$690	\$67	n/a	51%
Employment counseling and job training with paid work experience in the community	\$4,959	\$2,193	\$2,765	(\$5,378)	(\$420)	\$0.92	45%
Sex offender registration and community notification	(\$1,800)	(\$369)	(\$1,432)	(\$350)	(\$2,150)	(\$5.14)	33%
Inpatient or intensive outpatient drug treatment in the community	(\$1,344)	(\$124)	(\$1,220)	(\$889)	(\$2,233)	(\$1.51)	34%
Life skills education	(\$1,518)	(\$249)	(\$1,269)	(\$1,144)	(\$2,662)	(\$1.33)	35%
Driving Under the Influence (DUI) courts	\$4,324	\$2,531	\$1,793	(\$7,831)	(\$3,507)	\$0.55	18%
Domestic violence perpetrator treatment (Duluth-based model)	(\$2,174)	(\$413)	(\$1,762)	(\$1,448)	(\$3,623)	(\$1.50)	23%
Community-based correctional facilities (halfway houses)	(\$5,986)	(\$484)	(\$5,503)	(\$8,378)	(\$14,364)	(\$0.71)	0%
Police diversion for individuals with mental illness (pre-arrest)	(\$14,028)	(\$2,022)	(\$12,005)	(\$4,770)	(\$18,798)	(\$2.94)	1%

**Note:**

For informational purposes, we provide updated benefit-cost findings for all adult correctional intervention programs analyzed by WSIPP regardless of whether we updated the systematic review of the research literature for this report. This table better illustrates a current snapshot of all adult corrections programs analyzed to date by WSIPP.



# Appendices

The Effectiveness of Reentry Programs for Incarcerated Persons:  
*Findings for the Washington Statewide Reentry Council*

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For the vast majority of programs reviewed for this report, we were able to conduct a meta-analysis and a benefit-cost analysis.<sup>14</sup> Sometimes, however, WSIPP cannot conduct a benefit-cost analysis.

In some instances, we do not yet have an estimate of the per-participant cost for the program. Meta-analytic results for these programs appear in [Exhibit 2](#) in the main body of this report as well as [Appendix I](#). Programs with meta-analytic effects on recidivism, but for which we do not yet have program costs include:

- 1) Deferred prosecution of Driving Under the Influence (DUI) violations;
- 2) Housing assistance with services;
- 3) Housing assistance without services;
- 4) Revocation reduction programs;
- 5) Therapeutic communities for personality disorders; and
- 6) Violence reduction treatment.

In other instances, WSIPP cannot conduct a benefit-cost analysis either because we do not currently monetize the outcome analyzed in the study or because there was insufficient rigorous research available. Complete meta-analytic results for all programs appear in [Appendix I](#). In this Appendix, we discuss our findings for each of these circumstances in [Section I](#) and [II](#), respectively.

<sup>14</sup> We required at least two effect sizes for a meta-analysis. All recidivism outcomes are combined and reported as “crime” in the meta-analytic results in Appendix I and on our website.

## I. Meta-Analytic Results for Programs Reviewed

### Exhibit A1

#### Meta-Analytic Results For All Programs and Outcomes

Program name	Outcome	# of effect sizes	Adjusted effect size	Standard error	P-value	# in treatment
Case management ("swift, certain, and fair") for drug-involved persons	Crime	9	-0.1830	0.0724	0.0234	4,570
	Illicit drug use disorder	3	-0.0495	0.2486	0.8421	777
	Illicit drug use	4	-0.2867	0.1150	0.0127	962
	Technical violations	2	-0.2599	0.1047	0.0130	514
Case management (not "swift, certain, and fair") for drug-involved persons	Crime	19	-0.0468	0.0513	0.1630	3,624
	Employment	4	-0.1325	0.1413	0.3951	616
	Illicit drug use disorder	9	-0.2377	0.0914	0.0108	1,175
	Illicit drug use	2	0.0959	0.0902	0.2876	448
	Substance abuse	1	-0.0295	0.1321	0.8232	224
	Substance use	4	-0.1040	0.1045	0.3196	795
	Technical violations	7	0.1078	0.1334	0.3225	1,282
Circles of Support and Accountability	Crime	3	-0.3210	0.1796	0.0315	110
	Sex offense	3	-0.2512	0.1632	0.0239	135
	Technical violations	1	-0.7533	0.4653	0.1054	31
Civil legal aid	Court burden	3	0.0273	0.1021	0.7890	248
	Litigation success	5	0.2781	0.1424	0.0509	860
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) (for individuals classified as high- or moderate-risk)	Alcohol misuse	1	0.1081	0.3487	0.7566	23
	Crime	42	-0.1089	0.0286	0.0001	32,830
	Illicit drug misuse	2	0.1499	0.1938	0.1610	480
	Substance misuse	1	-0.7435	0.6157	0.2273	10
	Technical violations	6	-0.0105	0.0416	0.7270	3375
Community-based correctional facilities (halfway houses)	Crime	7	0.0164	0.0116	0.0711	22,371
	Technical violations	2	-0.3220	0.0209	0.0000	12,421
Correctional education (basic skills)	Crime	7	-0.1136	0.0495	0.0077	8,603
Correctional education (post-secondary education)	Crime	2	-0.2272	0.0618	0.0000	486
Correctional industries in prison	Crime	12	-0.0574	0.0178	0.0002	11,827
	Employment	1	0.0788	0.0859	0.0220	424
Day fines	Crime	1	-0.1633	0.1721	0.3426	191
	Payments/fines/restitution	2	0.3273	0.3246	0.2672	383
	Technical violations	1	-0.5565	0.1818	0.0022	191
Day reporting centers	Crime	4	-0.2418	0.1356	0.0296	399
	Employment	2	-0.2982	0.1283	0.0201	183
	Substance use	2	0.0877	0.1714	0.6088	196
	Technical violations	1	-0.2158	0.1419	0.1282	170
Deferred prosecution of DUI offenses	Alcohol-related offenses	2	-0.1645	0.0450	0.0027	3,647
Dialectical Behavior Therapy	Psychiatric symptoms	2	-0.3560	0.2050	0.0820	49
Domestic violence perpetrator treatment (Duluth-based model)	Crime	7	0.0160	0.0570	0.783	1,143
	Domestic violence	7	0.0483	0.0736	0.7215	1,143
Domestic violence perpetrator treatment (Non-Duluth models)	Alcohol use	1	-0.0262	0.2310	0.7564	38
	Crime	6	-0.0712	0.0853	0.0457	560
	Domestic violence	7	-0.0640	0.0783	0.0447	713
	Substance use	1	0.1094	0.2311	0.1970	38
Driving Under the Influence (DUI) courts	Alcohol-related offenses	6	-0.1354	0.0530	0.0494	2,424
	Crime	4	-0.2229	0.0983	0.0010	474
Drug courts	Crime	72	-0.2552	0.0251	0.0000	29,452

Program name	Outcome	# of effect sizes	Adjusted effect size	Standard error	P-value	# in treatment
Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative (for persons convicted of drug offenses)	Crime	1	-0.2717	0.1111	0.0145	264
Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative (for persons convicted of property offenses)	Crime	1	-0.1510	0.2260	0.5040	59
Electronic monitoring (parole)	Crime	8	-0.0689	0.0216	0.0000	11,777
Electronic monitoring (probation)	Crime	10	-0.1638	0.1253	0.1299	7,036
Employment counseling and job training (transitional reentry from incarceration into the community)	Crime	2	-0.2242	0.1021	0.0188	338
	Earnings	2	0.1907	0.0759	0.0012	338
	Technical violations	1	-0.6049	0.1313	0.0000	232
Employment counseling and job training in the community	Crime	9	-0.0595	0.0402	0.1105	2,830
	Earnings	1	0.2398	0.0932	0.0101	232
	Employment	1	-0.6760	0.1863	0.0003	104
	Technical violations	1	-0.6049	0.1313	0.0000	232
Employment counseling and job training with paid work experience in the community	Crime	10	-0.0865	0.0384	0.0205	4,973
	Earnings	1	0.0938	0.1309	0.0505	106
	Employment	1	0.0504	0.1428	0.3339	216
Housing assistance with services	Crime	5	-0.0781	0.0549	0.1898	1,329
Housing assistance without services	Crime	3	-0.0982	0.0451	0.0209	1,973
	Technical violations	1	-0.1809	0.1066	0.0001	179
Ignition interlock devices for alcohol-related offenses	Alcohol-related offenses	4	-0.2653	0.0476	0.0037	3,363
Inpatient or intensive outpatient drug treatment during incarceration	Crime	7	-0.1389	0.0492	0.0000	1,907
Inpatient or intensive outpatient drug treatment in the community	Crime	5	-0.0067	0.0395	0.2392	8,683
	Illicit drug misuse	2	0.1024	0.1073	0.2960	319
Intensive supervision (surveillance and treatment)	Crime	17	-0.1556	0.0426	0.0041	3,078
Intensive supervision (surveillance only)	Crime	14	-0.0050	0.0415	0.9206	2,094
	Technical violations	2	0.0880	0.3852	0.8192	498
Jail diversion for individuals with mental illness (post-arrest)	Alcohol misuse	5	0.1594	0.2415	0.5094	386
	Crime	6	-0.0203	0.0616	0.6269	556
	ED visits	5	0.4951	0.1217	0.0000	388
	Homelessness	5	0.0002	0.1202	0.9990	388
	Illicit drug misuse	5	-0.0292	0.1332	0.8262	386
	Psychiatric symptoms	5	-0.0036	0.0731	0.9605	388
Legal financial obligation repayment interventions	Payments/fines/restitution	7	0.1584	0.1104	0.1514	1,116
Life skills education	Crime	4	0.0095	0.0621	0.8765	1,130
	Technical violations	1	0.0126	0.0431	0.7703	887
Mental health courts	Crime	6	-0.1685	0.0749	0.0011	1,424
	Psychiatric symptoms	2	-0.3157	0.3304	0.3592	211
Offender Reentry Community Safety Program (for individuals with serious mental illness)	Crime	1	-0.7559	0.1465	0.0000	172
Outpatient or non-intensive drug treatment during incarceration	Crime	6	-0.0977	0.0383	0.0075	2,205
Outpatient or non-intensive drug treatment in the community	Crime	3	-0.1222	0.0085	0.0144	42,338
Parenting programs (for incarcerated parents)	Parenting success	3	0.2803	0.2059	0.0737	49

Program name	Outcome	# of effect sizes	Adjusted effect size	Standard error	P-value	# in treatment
Police diversion for individuals with mental illness (pre-arrest)	Alcohol misuse	3	0.0679	0.1700	0.6896	290
	Crime	3	0.0885	0.0812	0.2755	290
	ED visits	3	0.2894	0.3881	0.4559	290
	Homelessness	3	0.0592	0.1865	0.7509	290
	Illicit drug misuse	3	0.3250	0.2051	0.1130	290
	Psychiatric symptoms	3	0.0359	0.0814	0.6593	290
Police diversion for low-severity offenses (pre-arrest)	Crime	2	-0.0930	0.1047	0.2597	247
Reentry courts	Crime	2	-0.1737	0.0657	0.0082	584
	Technical violations	1	-0.3050	0.1197	0.0108	213
Restorative justice conferencing	Crime	6	-0.0719	0.1542	0.6411	266
Revocation reduction programs	Crime	1	-0.3281	0.1900	0.0842	162
	Technical violations	1	-0.2027	0.2005	0.3121	162
Risk Need and Responsivity supervision (for individuals classified as high- and moderate-risk)	Crime	14	-0.1090	0.0417	0.0005	8,575
	Technical violations	4	-0.1668	0.0675	0.2410	4,760
Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative (SVORI)	Crime	6	-0.2792	0.0567	0.0000	1,772
	Employment	4	0.1286	0.0853	0.0238	780
	Homelessness	3	0.0402	0.1164	0.7296	634
	Illicit drug use	3	-0.1067	0.0961	0.2671	610
	Technical violations	1	-0.0011	0.1703	0.9813	175
Sex offender registration and community notification	Crime	7	0.0158	0.0458	0.8357	19,142
	General deterrence	1	-0.0504	0.0130	0.0001	825
	Sex offense	8	-0.0434	0.0629	0.5904	24,392
Sober living houses	Crime	5	-0.0478	0.0867	0.2235	396
	Employment	4	0.2348	0.0908	0.0000	306
	Hours worked	1	0.1397	0.1493	0.0109	90
	Illicit drug misuse	3	-0.0938	0.1313	0.0268	253
	Substance abuse	2	-0.3236	0.1491	0.0000	143
"Swift, certain, and fair" supervision	Crime	11	-0.0955	0.0546	0.0687	6,790
	Illicit drug use disorder	3	-0.0495	0.2486	0.8421	777
	Illicit drug use	2	-0.4449	0.1563	0.0044	316
	Technical violations	4	-0.1944	0.0694	0.0013	5,473
Therapeutic communities (during incarceration) for individuals with substance use disorders	Crime	19	-0.0890	0.0232	0.0000	6,263
	Employment	5	0.0330	0.0453	0.4296	1,782
	Illicit drug misuse	3	-0.1363	0.1440	0.4105	993
	Technical violations	2	-0.0331	0.0868	0.3150	594
Therapeutic communities (in the community) for individuals with co-occurring disorders	Crime	6	-0.1602	0.0783	0.0003	588
	Illicit drug use disorder	4	-0.0663	0.0913	0.1336	447
	Substance use	1	-0.2402	0.2490	0.3347	70
Therapeutic communities (in the community) for individuals with substance use disorders	Crime	4	-0.1015	0.0643	0.0001	669
	Hours worked	1	-0.0184	0.1491	0.7349	90
	Illicit drug misuse	3	-0.2629	0.1298	0.0553	1,043
Therapeutic communities for individuals with personality disorders	Crime	1	-0.1753	0.1245	0.1592	694
Treatment during incarceration for individuals convicted of sex offenses	Crime	12	-0.0704	0.0362	0.0134	2,939
	Sex offense	11	-0.0445	0.0540	0.1713	2,750
Treatment in the community for individuals convicted of sex offenses	Crime	7	-0.0499	0.0607	0.0903	960
	Sex offense	6	-0.0333	0.0652	0.3122	887
Violence reduction treatment	Crime	2	-0.0194	0.0860	0.7646	409
Vocational education in prison	Crime	3	-0.1669	0.0751	0.0000	1,950
Work release	Crime	9	-0.0360	0.0182	0.0609	24,013
	Employment	2	0.7076	0.5607	0.2069	3,971
	Technical violations	2	0.3422	0.0303	0.0000	3,570



## II. Programs Meta-Analyzed with no Benefit-Cost Analysis.

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In some cases, there was sufficient rigorous research literature to examine and meta-analyze a program; however, we could not perform benefit-cost analysis because the studies only reported outcomes that WSIPP does not currently monetize. For this report, we meta-analyzed the outcomes reported in the studies and describe their effects below. Those programs and policies include:

- 1) Civil legal aid
- 2) Day fines
- 3) Legal financial obligation repayment interventions
- 4) Parenting programs for incarcerated parents
- 5) Removing criminal record check boxes in hiring

### 1) Civil legal aid

Civil legal aid services provide legal representation to defendants who cannot afford legal representation in non-criminal matters such as access to healthcare, housing, government benefits, employment, and educational services. Civil legal aid services are typically provided by legal aid attorneys, law students and volunteers who identify and address legal issues. These services may be provided in a variety of ways, including online chat tools, classrooms and clinics, “unbundled” legal services, and full legal representation from a lawyer.

We located four rigorous studies that could be included in this analysis. These studies examined the impact of receiving an offer of civil legal aid in the context of several different types of civil cases, including juvenile delinquency hearings and eviction cases. These studies compared the impact of an offer of full legal representation from a lawyer to 1) receiving no offer or 2) receiving unbundled legal services (in which legal advice is provided but the lawyer is not retained for full representation). Some, but not all, defendants in these studies were formerly incarcerated persons.


We meta-analyzed two broad outcomes: litigation success ([Exhibit A2](#)) and burden on the court process ([Exhibit A3](#)).

**Litigation success.** We considered several specific outcomes as indicators of “litigation success” for the represented individual. These outcomes include attending scheduled court appearances, receiving a judgment in their favor, retaining possession of a housing unit, receiving an order for repairs to their housing unit, or receiving rent abatement. A meta-analysis of these studies indicates an overall increase in litigation success for those who received an offer of civil legal representation.

**Burden on court process.** Several studies also measure the burden on court processes (including the case length, number of court appearances, motions, and instances where a judge interacted with a case). These studies indicate a small increase in court burden as a result of offers of civil legal aid on average; however, the weighted mean effect size is not statistically significant.


### Exhibit A2

Effect of Civil Legal Aid on Litigation Success (of the represented individual)



### Exhibit A3

Effect of Civil Legal Aid on Burden of Court Process



## 2) Day Fines


In the criminal justice system, fines can be used as a sanction when a person commits a crime. Typically the magnitude of these fines is determined based solely on the gravity of the offense, and not on the person's ability to pay the fine through legitimate means. Day fines are designed to achieve equitable punishment, by calibrating fines based on both the gravity of the offense as well as the individual's ability to pay. When day fines are assessed, a judge first determines the scale of punishment that is appropriate for the offense by calculating "punishment units." A punishment unit equals a day's pay. Thus, if a person is sanctioned to 3 punishment units (3 days' pay), the total amount paid by the individual depends on the person's income. This type of sanction is typically used for municipal violations or non-violent felonies.

We located two rigorous studies of day fine pilot programs in adult courts in the United States shown in [Exhibit A4](#). The Municipal Court in Milwaukee, Wisconsin conducted a twelve-week experiment with the use of day fines for non-traffic violations of municipal ordinances in 1989. Maricopa County, Arizona also conducted an experiment with a day fine probation alternative for individuals convicted of non-violent felonies known as the Financial Assessment Related to Employability (FARE) program in 1991.

Both of these studies examined the impact on the repayment of fines, shown in Exhibit A3. Each also reported outcomes related to subsequent legal violations, but we were not able to monetize this particular type of recidivism outcome (violations of municipal ordinances).

### Exhibit A4

Effect of Day Fines on Repayment of Fines




### 3) Legal financial obligation repayment programs

Legal financial obligations are fines, fees, and restitution imposed by the court when a person is sentenced for a crime. Programs to increase payment of legal financial obligations take various forms, but generally include a reminder letter detailing the amounts owed and describing the consequences of nonpayment.

Programs of the studies in this meta-analysis include phone calls, letters that include information on fines owed, and letters that detail the consequences of nonpayment (which may include a violation of probation). One study examined the impact of Project MUSTER, in which probationers received a violation of probation, performed community service, and were placed on intensive supervision with employment training and job placement.

The studies in this meta-analysis, shown in [Exhibit A5](#), examine the impact of these interventions on the repayment of legal financial obligations.


**Exhibit A5**  
Effect of Legal Financial Obligation Repayment Interventions on  
Payment of Fines, Fees, or Restitution



#### 4) Parenting programs for incarcerated parents

The goal of parenting programs is to help incarcerated parents acquire skills to increase efficacy of parenting, increase parental confidence and satisfaction, and reduce stress associated with parenting during incarceration. These programs teach parents about child development techniques for managing child behavior. Parents are assisted with strategies to communicate effectively with their children, given the unique circumstances presented by incarceration. Visitation is an important component of the program, which can include didactic instruction (learning through experience/teaching) while supervised by a program instructor. Programs vary in length; typically lasting two to three months.

This meta-analysis, shown in Exhibit A6, includes studies of parenting programs for incarcerated mothers and fathers. The programs include filial therapy—family-focused play therapy— and Systematic Training for Effective Parenting (STEP). Studies in this meta-analysis did not report recidivism as an outcome measure; however, they did report a variety of parenting measures, including parental stress, satisfaction, empathy, acceptance, and locus of control. We combined all of these measures into a broad “parenting success” outcome for each study. A positive effect size indicates improvement in one or more of these parenting measures, on average.



## 5) Removing criminal record check boxes in hiring (employment effects on general population)

Policies to remove criminal record check boxes on employment applications, commonly referred to as “ban the box” policies, intend to reduce hiring discrimination against individuals with a criminal record by requiring employers to delay asking about criminal history until later in the hiring process. These policies are intended to impact persons with criminal records, but might also impact the population in general.

Over 150 cities and counties have removed criminal record check boxes in municipal hiring. Twenty-four states have adopted statewide policies that affect public employers and nine states require the removal of conviction history from private employers’ job applications. An executive branch memorandum in 2016 directed federal agencies to delay inquiring about criminal history in the application process.<sup>15</sup>

No rigorous studies could be located that evaluated the effect of these policies on individuals with a criminal record. We located four rigorous studies that examined the effect of these policies on employment-related outcomes for the general population—all working-age people living within the jurisdiction. That is, these policies do not evaluate the effect specifically on a criminal justice-involved population. Using large national datasets on employment, these studies explored whether policies to remove criminal record check boxes in hiring cause disproportionately negative effects for minorities in the general population compared to similar jurisdictions that have not removed criminal record check boxes.

- 1) Doleac & Hansen, (2016) examined the effect banning criminal record check boxes in hiring on young, low-skilled black and Hispanic men. They found a net decrease of 3.4% in employment among young black men and a 2.3% decrease in employment among young Hispanic men after a ban on criminal record check boxes in hiring took effect. They also found a 2.8% decrease in employment among middle-aged non-white Hispanic men. Those drops in employment were offset by increases in employment for other groups—employment increased by 2.8% for black men with high school diplomas and by 3.15% for black women with college degrees. Effects on other groups were not found to be statistically significant.
- 2) Hirashima, (2016) finds negative effects on employment, wages, income, and usual hours worked overall after a policy to ban criminal record check boxes in hiring was enacted. These effects were larger for black men.
- 3) Shoag & Veuger, (2016), in contrast, found increases in employment in high-crime neighborhoods following the implementation of a policy to ban criminal record check boxes in hiring.
- 4) Agan & Starr, (2016) examined the effects of banning criminal record check boxes in hiring on callback rates for job applications. They submitted 15,000 fictitious online job applications to employers in New York City and New Jersey before and after criminal record check boxes were banned in those jurisdictions. The job applications were for 21-22 year old males with racially distinctive “white” and “black” names. They compared the callback rates for these job applications to 1) rates before the ban and 2) rates for employers whose applications did not contain a question about criminal history before or after the ban was adopted. They found that the racial gap in callback rates expanded by about four percentage points after a ban on criminal record check boxes in hiring was implemented.

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<sup>15</sup> Rodriguez, M., & Avery, B. (2016). *U.S. cities, counties, and states adopt fair-chance policies to advance employment opportunities for people with past convictions*. Retrieved from <http://nelp.org/content/uploads/Ban-the-Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide.pdf>

Effect sizes for these employment effects are shown in [Exhibit A7](#). Because this literature examines the effects of employment being displaced between different demographic groups in the general population, we do not provide a weighted average effect size on employment. That is, these studies examined the relative effects of the policies on various groups in the general population, not overall employment rates, and not the effect of these policies on individuals with a criminal history record.

### Exhibit A7

Effect of Removing Criminal Record Check Boxes on Employment Outcomes

Citation	Effect size	p-value	Race	Gender	Age	Education level
Agan et al. 2016	-0.1484 <sup>##</sup>	0.00002	Black	Male	21-22	HS diploma
Agan et al. 2016	0.1079 <sup>##</sup>	0.00158	White	Male	21-22	HS diploma
Doleac & Hansen 2016	-0.3867 <sup>#</sup>	0.00000	Black	Male	25-34	No HS diploma or GED
Doleac & Hansen 2016	-0.2664 <sup>#</sup>	0.00000	Hispanic	Male	25-34	No HS diploma or GED
Doleac & Hansen 2016	-0.0902	0.00000	Black	Male	25-34	No college degree
Doleac & Hansen 2016	-0.0894	0.00000	Hispanic	Male	25-34	No HS diploma or GED
Doleac & Hansen 2016	-0.0806	0.00000	Hispanic	Male	35-64	No HS diploma or GED
Doleac & Hansen 2016	-0.0715	0.00000	Black	Female	25-34	No HS diploma or GED
Doleac & Hansen 2016	-0.0110	0.01144	White	Male	25-34	No college degree
Doleac & Hansen 2016	-0.0085	0.13553	Hispanic	Male	25-34	College degree
Doleac & Hansen 2016	0.0011	0.63160	White	Male	35-64	No college degree
Doleac & Hansen 2016	0.0016	0.66313	White	Female	25-34	No college degree
Doleac & Hansen 2016	0.0018	0.68318	White	Female	25-34	College degree
Doleac & Hansen 2016	0.0044	0.22402	Black	Female	25-34	No college degree
Doleac & Hansen 2016	0.0073	0.46041	Hispanic	Female	25-34	No HS diploma or GED
Doleac & Hansen 2016	0.0097	0.02595	Hispanic	Female	25-34	No college degree
Doleac & Hansen 2016	0.0134	0.00000	Black	Male	35-64	College degree
Doleac & Hansen 2016	0.0275	0.00000	White	Male	35-64	College degree
Doleac & Hansen 2016	0.0282	0.00453	White	Female	25-34	No HS diploma or GED
Doleac & Hansen 2016	0.0317	0.00001	White	Male	25-34	College degree
Doleac & Hansen 2016	0.0365	0.00000	White	Male	35-64	No HS diploma or GED
Doleac & Hansen 2016	0.0378	0.00000	Black	Male	25-34	College degree
Doleac & Hansen 2016	0.0503	0.00000	Hispanic	Female	25-34	No college degree
Doleac & Hansen 2016	0.0514	0.00000	Hispanic	Male	35-64	No college degree
Doleac & Hansen 2016	0.0588	0.00000	Hispanic	Male	35-64	College degree
Doleac & Hansen 2016	0.0765	0.00000	Black	Male	35-64	No college degree
Doleac & Hansen 2016	0.1040	0.00000	Black	Male	35-64	No HS diploma or GED
Doleac & Hansen 2016	0.1123 <sup>#</sup>	0.00000	White	Male	25-34	No HS diploma or GED
Doleac & Hansen 2016	0.1289	0.00000	Black	Female	25-34	College degree
Hirashima 2016	-0.0999 <sup>#</sup>	0.00000	Black	Female	All ages	All educational levels
Hirashima 2016	-0.0634	0.00000	All	All	All ages	All educational levels
Hirashima 2016	-0.0499 <sup>#</sup>	0.00000	Black	Male	All ages	All educational levels
Shoag & Veuger 2016	0.0092 <sup>###</sup>	0.10538	All	All	All ages	All educational levels

# These effect sizes are subsets of other demographic group effects.

## The outcome for these effect sizes is callbacks from job applications.

### The outcome for this effect size is employment in high-crime neighborhoods.

## Citations for programs meta-analyzed with no benefit-cost analysis

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### III. Programs with Insufficient Rigorous Research for a Meta-Analysis

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In some cases, we investigated programs for which the research literature contains limited research evidence. In this section of the Appendix, we provide a description of the programs reviewed. We also describe findings for when we could only locate one study that met WSIPP's minimum standards of rigor. To conduct a meta-analysis, we required a minimum of two studies.

#### Cautioning for cannabis offenses

These programs give discretion to police officers to issue a formal caution instead of pursuing criminal charges for minor offenses related to the possession of cannabis. No rigorous evaluations of these programs could be located.

#### Child support—programs aimed at reducing barriers

Some members of the Council expressed interest in programs intended to help individuals reenter communities by assisting the individuals in supporting their children. No rigorous evaluations of these programs could be located.

#### Mentoring programs

In these programs, justice-involved individuals are assigned to a mentor, typically a non-professional volunteer, and they meet approximately once a week. Mentors are intended to help individuals build social capital by engaging in pro-social relationships. Mentors are also intended to assist individuals in gaining access to community resources that may be helpful for reentry (e.g., Alcoholics Anonymous), attend social functions together (e.g., movies or sporting events), and help individuals engage in positive decision-making and problem-solving.

Although we have completed reviews of mentoring for youth in the juvenile justice system and for youth in the community who are not involved with the justice system, we were unable to locate rigorous studies on mentoring for adults who were previously incarcerated.

#### Pre-trial detention

After a person is charged with a crime and before the case is adjudicated by the court, a judge decides whether the person can receive bail—with the potential to be released into the community—or whether that person should be detained in jail until trial. Judges typically have substantial discretion in their decisions.

We only located one evaluation that examined the effects of pre-trial detention on subsequent criminal behavior (Dobbie et al., 2016). The evaluation assessed the impact of pre-trial detention for persons who would have been released to the community (e.g. by paying bail) had their bail judge been more lenient. The evaluation assessed the impact for those who are most likely to be affected by loosening the conditions for release. The authors' findings indicate pretrial detention increases the probability of arrest following disposition of the index offense by 15 percentage points; however, those released before trial (e.g. on bail) were 13 percentage points more likely to be arrested prior to disposition of their index offenses.

### Project Sentry

Project Sentry is an initiative to reduce gun violence that includes enforcement initiatives (prosecution of gun crimes committed at schools, prosecution of adults who provide guns to juveniles, and prosecution of juveniles who violate firearms laws) as well as prevention and deterrence. Educational elements of this program may be provided by people such as law enforcement officers, prosecutors, corrections officers, judges, social service personnel, medical professionals, or school officials. No rigorous evaluations of this program could be located.

### Revocation reduction programs

When probationers or parolees violate the terms of supervision in the community, these individuals can be ordered to serve time in prison or jail for their technical violation. Revocation reduction programs target these individuals by providing case management services to high-risk individuals with the intent of reducing the number of subsequent technical revocations.

We only located one rigorous study (Clark, 2015), which found that participants experienced a 42% reduction in recidivism, relative to the population's baseline recidivism rate. The study also found a 28.5% reduction from the baseline probability that a participant would engage in a technical violation of parole conditions.

### State identification provision

The 2016 Washington State Legislature and the Council have expressed interest in providing individuals reentering the community with Washington State identification cards. State identification can facilitate acquisition of employment and access to some government services. No rigorous evaluations of this type of program could be located.

### Therapeutic communities for people with personality disorders

Prison-based therapeutic communities are an intensive form of therapeutic treatment. Participants remain within correctional facilities but live apart from the general prison population in a 24/7 therapeutic milieu. While therapeutic communities are typically used to treat chemical dependency, they have also been used to treat serious mental illness. Therapeutic communities use a hierarchical social learning model, wherein participants earn increased social and personal responsibility as they progress through stages of treatment. Treatment involves a highly structured therapeutic environment, peer support and peer accountability to teach participants prosocial norms and behaviors. Depending on the program, participants may remain in therapeutic communities for 12 to 22 months with programming on weekdays and live-in staff.

Only one rigorous evaluation of therapeutic communities for personality disorders could be located (Taylor, 2000). That evaluation found a reduction in recidivism of six percentage points for program participants.

### Veterans courts

Like other therapeutic courts (e.g., drug courts, mental health courts, DUI courts), veterans courts provide an alternative to traditional criminal justice system processing for arrested veterans. Veterans courts use a combination of supervision and monitoring and tailor services to veterans, which can include treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder, brain or other service-related trauma, and mental health conditions. No rigorous evaluations could be located.

### Visitation during incarceration

Several observational studies have demonstrated that prisoners who receive personal visits from friends and family are less likely to recidivate. This relationship is correlational. The observed relationship may be caused by unmeasured factors, such as intrinsic personal characteristics, and visitation may be a consequence of those same factors. Researchers have been unable to produce evidence that personal prison visitation causes a reduction in recidivism.

Researchers (Duwe & Johnson, 2016) studied prison visitation from community volunteers, such as clergy and mentors. While the researchers were unable to account for unmeasured characteristics, they used a rigorous analytic strategy to account for a large number of measured factors. Their evaluation suggests visitation from community volunteers may cause a 20% reduction in recidivism, relative to the baseline rate of the population.

### Citations for programs with insufficient rigorous research available for a meta-analysis.

These studies were rigorous enough to meet WSIPP's standard of rigor; however, we could not conduct a meta-analysis because each of these four studies represents a different program.

Clark, V.A. (2015). Making the most of second chances: an evaluation of Minnesota's high-risk revocation reduction reentry program. *Journal of Experimental Criminology*, 11(2), 193-215.

Dobbie, W., Goldin, J., & Yang, C. (2016). *The effects of pre-trial detention on conviction, future crime, and employment: Evidence from randomly assigned judges* (Working Paper No. 22511). National Bureau of Economic Research.

Duwe, G., & Johnson, B.R. (2016). The effects of prison visits from community volunteers on offender recidivism. *The Prison Journal*, 96(2), 279-303.

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